On 15 June 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted its first formal conclusions on Global Gateway, five years after the strategy's launch. They come just three months after the European Parliament passed, by 371 votes to 146 with 80 abstentions, a report calling for greater transparency, stronger democratic oversight and deeper participation by local partners in project selection. Both texts land in the middle of a negotiation of far greater consequence: the Global Europe instrument, put forward by the European Commission in July 2025 as the centrepiece of external action in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF, 2028-2034), is now moving through ordinary legislative procedure between the Council and Parliament, with both institutions declaring their ambition to conclude before the end of the year. What gets decided there will set the budget behind Global Gateway and define what kind of strategy it actually is. And in that debate, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) holds an argument no other region can match: the structural conditions for Global Gateway to work are already in place. What is still missing is investment at the necessary scale, deployed through the right instruments.
The starting point for this argument is the nature of the region itself. According to the World Bank's country classifications, the share of high-income countries in Latin America and the Caribbean rose from 9% in 1987 to roughly 46% today, with most of the remainder sitting in the upper-middle-income bracket. That places several LAC countries beyond the reach of concessional official development assistance (ODA), while leaving intact a financing gap that ODA was never designed to close. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimates the region needs to invest US$2.2 billion by 2030 in water, sanitation, electricity, transport and telecommunications to meet the Sustainable Development Goals, equivalent to at least 3.12% of regional GDP a year, some 70% above the average of the past decade. ECLAC frames the same problem from another angle: its 2024 report on development traps identifies low growth capacity, high inequality with weak social mobility, and fragile institutions as three mutually reinforcing obstacles. The latest edition of the Latin American Economic Outlook, produced jointly by the OECD, ECLAC, CAF and the European Union and complemented by its new report on Caribbean development dynamics, adds one more piece: the region's capital markets remain shallow, at 37.4% of GDP against an OECD average of 64.4%, meaning that every euro mobilised through instruments like Global Gateway carries proportionally more weight in LAC than it would in economies with deeper financial systems.
Layered on top of that gap is a material shift. The region holds the so-called lithium triangle spanning Argentina, Bolivia and Chile, globally significant copper deposits in Chile and Peru, substantial green hydrogen potential, close to 60% of the planet's biodiversity, and a power mix already about 30% renewable. The Global Gateway Investment Agenda, launched at the 2023 EU-CELAC Summit with a Team Europe commitment of €45 billion through 2027, explicitly names critical raw materials, lithium and green hydrogen among its priority value chains. Read alongside the EU's Critical Raw Materials Act, the Agenda reveals its underlying logic: LAC is a strategic node in contested supply chains and, at the same time, a natural partner for the twin green and digital transitions, with the biodiversity, renewable energy and industrial potential to climb up those same value chains.
That is the structural argument. But what sets LAC apart, rather than making it just one more region competing for Global Gateway's attention, is how it compares with the two geographies that dominate the literature on the rivalry with China's Belt and Road Initiative: Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. Against Africa, the difference is one of instrument. There, traditional official development assistance remains the centre of the system, so a shift in European financial behaviour can still be read as a response to humanitarian need. In LAC, concessional aid is residual, which means any shift reads, almost without ambiguity, as pure strategy, making the European commitment more legible and easier to justify and audit before its own taxpayers. Against Southeast Asia, the difference is one of configuration. There, the United States, Japan and China compete around a deep manufacturing integration that LAC does not have. LAC instead combines a set of features that rarely coincide with this intensity anywhere else: the historic weight of the United States as a hegemonic partner, now more volatile than ever, with the dismantling of USAID leaving the European Union as the region's most relevant cooperation counterpart; the strongest claim to "natural partnership" the EU makes anywhere on the planet, backed by a network of Association Agreements that, following the conclusion of the Mercosur and Mexico agreements in 2026, now covers nearly the entire continent except Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia; and a commodity-exporting economic structure, not integrated into manufacturing chains, whose leading buyer today is China. The Asian giant is the largest trading partner for much of the region, even as its role as a bilateral lender has shrunk dramatically since 2010, giving way to a growing presence built on foreign direct investment and equity stakes in energy, mining and ports, precisely the sectors the Global Gateway Investment Agenda also prioritises.
The paradox is precisely the opportunity. LAC is the region where the EU makes its strongest rhetorical claim while, at the same time, shows one of its weakest material footprints: of the €300 billion originally pledged under Global Gateway through 2027, only €45 billion, or 15%, went to LAC. The European Commission says it has already exceeded that global target and has set a new goal of €400 billion for the same horizon, but there is no sign yet that the share allocated to the LAC region will grow at the same pace. If there is one place where a strategy of competing on quality rather than volume should produce visible results, it is Latin America and the Caribbean. And if it does not, the explanation will have to be sought within the European Union itself, not in the region's conditions.
The Council's conclusions of 15 June and the amendments already adopted on 30 March to the External Action Guarantee, which simplify procedures and give Global Gateway projects greater flexibility, point in the right direction: more governance, more transparency, more private-sector participation. The next step is to turn those intentions into verifiable metrics for LAC specifically, moving from announced projects to monitored ones, with periodic reporting and measurable targets. The Association Agreements already provide the institutional scaffolding to do so, with dispute-resolution mechanisms and channels for political dialogue that no other bi-regional partnership can match. And the promise of just transitions (i.e. manufacturing batteries in Salta and Jujuy rather than simply extracting the lithium) needs concrete commitments ahead of the next review of the Investment Agenda at the EU-CELAC Summit and the next Global Gateway Forum, both expected in Brussels next year.
For policymakers and investors, the conclusion is simple: if Global Gateway is going to prove anywhere that it can offer something different from traditional aid and from China's infrastructure diplomacy, that place is Latin America and the Caribbean. For those who study it, whether from academia, journalism or civil society, the conclusion is just as direct: the literature on global geoeconomic competition still looks mostly to Africa. But to understand what Global Gateway actually is, rather than what it claims to be, LAC is the place to look first.
(The views expressed on the EU-LAC Blog are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the EU-LAC Foundation).